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1 Introduction 
 
Members of the police in South Africa are burdened with a Constitutional duty1 to 
prevent, investigate and combat crime, a duty to maintain law and public order, and 
to ensure the protection and security of all South Africans.2 This is no easy task, as 
South Africa boasts with some of the gravest crime statistics in the world.3  
 
Police power to arrest is vital in the implementation of this duty to combat crime, but 
is also a concept demanding careful balancing of the suspect’s rights to dignity,4 life,5 
and freedom and security of person,6 with society’s entitlement to the same rights. 
The use of force while effecting arrests is legitimate in most systems of law.7 
However, what normally gives rise to dispute, is the degree of force to be permitted.8 
 
Section 49 of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, provides police 
officers with legal justification to use force in carrying out arrests, and includes the 
rules governing the degree of force to be used, as well as the circumstances in 
which such force may be employed. Where a police officer’s forceful conduct 
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1
  S 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). 
2
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 640: par 48. 
3
  Harrendorf et al. (Eds) International statistics on crime and justice 11. 
 While the world average homicide rate in 2008 was 7,6 murders per 100 000 people, the South 
African average for the same year was 36,5 murders per 100 000 people. 
4
  S 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
5
  S 11 of the Constitution. 
6
  S 12 of the Constitution. 
7
      Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure 198. 
8
      Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure 198. 
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extends beyond the ambit of these legislative provisions, that officer may be subject 
to criminal liability.9 
 
The authority of police to employ force, even deadly force, in effecting arrests has 
been subject to intense judicial,10 as well as media scrutiny over the past few years. 
In 2003, police powers to use deadly force was considered and subsequently limited 
by a Constitutional Court decision in Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S 
v Walters.11 Section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was deemed 
unconstitutional and declared invalid.12  
 
Subsequent to the constitutional invalidation of section 49(2), the legislature 
promulgated a 2003 redefined section 49.  The amendments to section 49 were met 
with some controversy. Some authors13 viewed this decision as a legislative 
guarantee of a suspect’s right to flee, while others14 stated that the 2003 redefined 
section 49 required arrestors to make split-second decisions in daunting 
circumstances,15 prompting one to reason that section 49 only sanctioned use of 
force during arrests in situations of private defence. This concern was shared by the 
Minister of Safety and Security at the time the 2003  redefined section 49 was 
promulgated.16 
 
In 2009, after the release of daunting statistics on the amount of police officers killed 
in the line of duty,17 senior government officials made public declarations that 
seemed to promote the idea of using deadly force in combating crime.18 This was 
                                                          
9
      Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure 197. 
10
  Du Toit et al. Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 5-25. 
11
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters [2002] 4 SA 613 (CC). 
12
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters [2002] 4 SA 613 (CC); Van der Walt T 
2007 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 100. 
13
  Snyman Criminal Law 135. 
14
  Van der Walt 2007 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 105. 
15
  Fear of criminal prosecution when injuring of fatally wounding a person in an attempt to arrest 
him, might rob police officers of the fervour to perform this important policing task – Du Toit et al. 
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 5-25. 
16
  Van der Walt 2011 Potchefstroom Electronic Journal 140. 
17
  During the 2008/2009 financial year of the SAPS, 109 officers were reportedly killed in the line of 
duty, while 107 perished during the 2009/2010 year - South African Police Service 2008/2009 
Annual Report 20 and 2009/2010 Annual Report 18. 
18
  Open Society Foundation for South Africa Report on the OSF-SA roundtable discussion on the 
human rights and practical implications of the proposed amendment to section 49 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 2010:1; Smith 2009 www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/16/south-africa-police-
world-cup. 
 R BOTHA AND J VISSER                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)2 
348 / 569 
 
followed by prominent cases of abuse of the power to use lethal force.19 In fact, it 
has been reported that during 2008/2009 and 2009/2010, at least 1 092 people lost 
their lives as a result of the use of force by the police, the highest number since the 
late 1990’s.20 This seems peculiar, as there were no legislative or policy 
amendments regarding the use of force by police during this time. 
 
Bruce21 argues that, in light of the fact that the very objective of a police force is to 
protect human life, misuse of force by police may give rise to public instability and 
essentially to decreased safety of police officers in carrying out their duties. Reports 
of misuse of force can perhaps then easily explain the spate of murdered police 
officers in recent years. 
 
In light of recent controversies regarding use of force and police killings, as well as 
severe concerns about the difficulty in the proper interpretation of the 2003 redefined 
section 49,22 an amendment to section 49 has been formulated in the shape of the 
Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill of 2010,23 which, at the time of publication of 
this study, was approved by the National Assembly without assent, and is due for 
concurrence by the National Council of Provinces.24 
 
This article endeavours to investigate the desirability of the planned legislative 
reform. A comparative study will also be conducted to assess whether the South 
African legal position pertaining to use of force is in line with that of foreign 
jurisdictions and to facilitate the formulation of possible recommendations for 
favourable regulation of forceful arrests.  
 
Understanding current legislative provisions and creating clear and efficient new 
laws to empower police officials to effect forceful arrests are vital in establishing legal 
                                                          
19
  Bruce 2011 South African Crime Quarterly 3. 
20
  Bruce 2011 South African Crime Quarterly 3; Van der Walt 2011 Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 145 footnote 45. 
21
  Bruce 2011 South African Crime Quarterly 4. 
22
  Snyman Criminal Law 137. 
23
  GN 949 in GG 33619 of 7 October 2010; Open Society Foundation for South Africa Report on 
the OSF-SA roundtable discussion on the human rights and practical implications of the 
proposed amendment to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010:2. 
24
  SabinetLaw 2012 www.sabinetlaw.co.za/defence-and-security/articles/national-assembly-
passes-saps-bill. 
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certainty, as well as providing the police with much-needed guidance in performing 
their sometimes very dangerous constitutional duty. 
 
2 Historical development   
  
Section 49 and its predecessors25 have been contained in South Africa’s law books 
for more than 165 years.26 It is one of the most amended sections in the South 
African criminal procedure, having been amended four times, with a fifth amendment 
currently underway.27 Due to the nature and extent thereof it has always been 
subject to criticism, even before the birth of the Constitution.28  
 
The two most significant decisions influencing the reform of the old section 49 , are  
Govender v Minister of Safety and Security29 and Ex parte Minister of Safety and 
Security: in re S v Walters.30 At the time these cases were decided, section 49 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 197731 read as follows: 
 
 49. Use of force in effecting arrest 
(1) If any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to assist in 
arresting another, attempts to arrest such person and such 
person- 
(a) resists the attempt and cannot be arrested without the 
use of force; or 
(b) flees when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him is 
being made, or resists such attempt and flees; 
 
the person so authorised may, in order to effect the arrest, use 
such force as may in the circumstances be reasonably 
necessary to overcome the resistance or to prevent the person 
concerned from fleeing. 
 
(2) Where the person concerned is to be arrested for an offence 
referred to in Schedule 1 or is to be arrested on the ground that 
                                                          
25
  S 1 of Ordinance 2 of 1837 (C); s 41 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1 of 1903 (T); s 44 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 31 of 1917 and s 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955. 
26
  Van der Walt T 2007 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 96. See also in this regard Van der 
Walt T 2011 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 138. 
27
     Le Roux-Kemp and Horne 2011 SACJ 266. 
28
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 629. See also Van der Walt 2007 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 97.  
29
  [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA). 
30
  [2002] 4 SA 613 (CC). 
31
    Some refer to this piece of legislation as the section dealing with the use of lethal force in the pre-
constitutional era – Le Roux-Kemp and Horne 2011 SACJ 271. 
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he is reasonably suspected of having committed such an 
offence, and the person authorised under this Act to arrest or to 
assist in arresting him cannot arrest him or prevent him from 
fleeing by other means than by killing him, the killing shall be 
deemed justifiable. 
 
From the above it is clear that section 49(1) provided the framework for the use of 
force only, while section 49(2) set the framework for circumstances under which the 
use of deadly force would be justified.32 Govender v Minister of Safety and Security33 
contributed to the development of section 49(1), while Ex Parte Minister of Safety 
and Security: in re S v Walters34 lead to the declaration of unconstitutionality of 
section 49(2).35 
 
A brief discussion of the abovementioned cases and development of section 49(1) 
and 49(2) respectively, will now follow. 
 
  
                                                          
32
     Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure  199. 
33
  [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA). 
34
  [2002] 4 SA 613 (CC). 
35
  Du Toit et al. Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 5-24. 
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2.1  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA) 
 
In an appeal following the High Court’s ruling that a police officer’s conduct, namely 
shooting at a 17 year old boy during an attempted car theft, was not unlawful, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal had to investigate the proper interpretation of the old 
section 49(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.36  
 
On behalf of the appellant it was argued that section 49(1) violated the following 
rights contained in the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 
1993: the right to life,37 the right to physical integrity,38 the right to protection of 
dignity,39 the right to be presumed innocent until convicted by a court of law40 and 
the right to equality before the law and to equal protection from the law.41 The 
question arose whether these limitations passed the test of being “reasonable” and 
“justifiable” as set out in section 33(1) of the Interim Constitution.42 
 
The court, in answering the above, was of the opinion that it depended on the proper 
interpretation of section 49(1).43 It is clearly the purpose of section 49 to protect the 
safety and security of all persons. This, however, must be brought into balance with 
the constitutional rights also enjoyed by the fleeing suspect.44 
 
The Court explained that the threshold requirement for the use of force, as 
previously interpreted, was extremely low.45 It was previously raised in the case 
Matlou v Makhubedu46 where the Court of Appeal held that a proportionality test 
must be included in the interpretation of the words reasonably necessary as found in 
the then section 49(1). More specifically, in the Matlou-case, the court required 
                                                          
36
  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA) 280 par 9. 
37
  S 9. 
38
  S 11. 
39
  S 10. 
40
  S 25(3)(e). 
41
  S 8(1). 
42
  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA) 281 par 14. 
43
  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA) 281 par 14. 
44
  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA) 281 par 12-14. 
45
  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA) 281 par 16. 
46
  Matlou v Makhubedu [1978] 1 SA 946 (A). 
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proportionality between the degree of force used by the arresting officer and the 
seriousness of the crime committed by the arrestee.47 
 
However, the appellant in the Govender-case argued that even the “raised” threshold 
requirement as laid down in the Matlou-decision was too low to comply with the 
constitutional values of reasonableness and justifiability.48  
 
Therefore, and with due consideration to the American case, Tennessee v Garner,49 
the court in the Govender-case expanded the proportionality requirement further and 
held that an additional factor to be considered was whether the suspect posed an 
immediate threat or danger of serious physical harm to the arresting officer, others 
and society as a whole.50  
 
The court stated that: 
 
The words “use such force as may in the circumstances be reasonably 
necessary to prevent the person concerned from fleeing” in section 
49(1)(b) of the Act must therefore generally speaking (there may be 
exceptions) be interpreted so as to exclude the use of a firearm or 
similar weapon unless the person authorised to arrest, or assist in 
arresting, a fleeing suspect has reasonable grounds for believing: 
1 that the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious bodily 
harm to him or her, or a threat of harm to members of the 
public; or 
2  that the suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction 
or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm.51 
 
                                                          
47
  As cited in Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 281-282 (SCA) 282 par 16. 
Also see Du Toit et al. Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 5-27; Neethling and Potgieter 
2004 Tydskrif van die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 604. 
48
  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA) 282 par 17. 
49
  Tennessee v Garner 471 U.S. 1, 85 L.Ed.2d 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (1985). In this Supreme Court 
case decided in 1985, the court delineated criteria for the use of force when arresting a fleeing 
suspect in the United States of America. Several principles were formulated to replace the 
previously used ‘any means necessary’ requirement that allowed for a wide scope of opportunity 
to use excessive force in effecting arrests of fleeing suspects or those resisting arrest in America. 
See the discussion on comparative law below. 
50
  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA) 282-283 par 17-22. Also see 
Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 201. 
51
  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA) 284 par 24. Also see Le 
Roux-Kemp and Horne 2011 SACJ  274. 
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Interpreting section 49(1) as explained above, the court came to the conclusion that 
the conduct of the police officer, shooting at an unarmed 17 years old who posed no 
threat or danger to the arrestor or society, was unlawful.52 
 
2.2  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: in re S v Walters and Another 
[2002] 4 SA 613 (CC) 
 
Contrary to the Govender-case, the court in Ex parte: Minister of Safety and 
Security: in re S v Walters53 had to decide on the constitutionality of section 49(2) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.54 
 
The criminal prosecution in this case arose as a result of a shooting incident 
following a break-in at the bakery of Accused 1 and 2 (father and son), causing the 
death of the burglar. The accused persons were charged with murder and raised 
section 49(2) as ground of justification.55 The trial judge found the section to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, specifically 
with regards to the suspect’s constitutional rights to life, human dignity and bodily 
integrity. The court held that this limitation of the constitutional rights could not be 
justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.56  A declaration of invalidity of 
section 49(2) was compiled and, in terms of section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution, 
referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation.57 
 
The Constitutional Court, in deciding the matter, stated that the test accepted in the 
Govender-case as prerequisite to the use of force (section 49(1)), should at the very 
least also be the prerequisite for the use of deadly violence (section 49(2)).58 In 
addition to this, the court held that insufficient proportionality existed between the 
                                                          
52
  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 SA 273 (SCA) 283-284 par 21-24. 
53
  Ex parte: Minister of Safety and Security: in re S v Walters [2002] 4 SA 613 (CC). 
54
  Van der Walt 2007 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 98. See also discussion in Du Toit 
Commentaries on the Criminal Procedure Act 5-33. 
55
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 623. 
56
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 623. 
57
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 623. 
58
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 615. Also see Le Roux-Kemp and Horne 2011 SACJ 275. 
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employment of deadly force in effecting arrests and the broad list of offences 
contained in Schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act.59 The court held: 
 
The Schedule lists a widely divergent rag-bag of some 20 offences, 
ranging from really serious crimes with an element of violence, such as 
treason, public violence, murder, rape and robbery at one end of the 
spectrum to, at the other end, relatively petty offences, such as picket-
pocketing or grabbing a mealie from a fruit-stall. What is more, the 
Schedule includes offences that do not constitute any kind of physical 
threat, let alone violence.60 
 
It was therefore emphasised that the list was “simply too wide and inappropriately 
focused to permit a constitutionally defensible line to be drawn for the permissible 
use of deadly force.”61 Du Toit et al.62 suggests the inclusion of Schedule 1 fails to 
fulfill the legislature’s intention to distinguish between serious and less serious 
offences and does therefore not succeed in serving as test for proportionality. 
                                                          
59
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 614. 
Schedule 1 includes the following crimes: 
Treason. 
Sedition. 
Public violence. 
Murder. 
Culpable homicide. 
Rape.  
Indecent assault (at present known as sexual assault in terms of section 5 of the Sexual 
Offences Amendment Act). 
Bestiality. 
Robbery. 
Kidnapping. 
Childstealing. 
Assault, when a dangerous wound is inflicted. 
Arson. 
Malicious injury to property. 
Breaking or entering any premises, with intent to commit an offence. 
Theft. 
Receiving of stolen property knowing it to have been stolen. 
Fraud. 
Forgery and uttering. 
Any offence, except the offence of escaping from lawful custody in circumstances other than 
the circumstances referred to immediately hereunder, the punishment wherefore may be a 
period of imprisonment exceeding six months without the option of a fine. 
Escaping from lawful custody, where the person concerned is in such custody in respect of 
any offence referred to in this Schedule or is in such custody in respect of the offence of 
escaping from lawful custody. 
Any conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit any offence referred to in this Schedule. 
60
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 615-616.  
61
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 616. 
62
  Du Toit et al.Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 5-27 and 5-33.. 
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Burchell63 confirms this sentiment and notes the absence of any reference to 
Schedule 1 in the 2003 redefined section 49.  
 
Section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act was accordingly deemed 
unconstitutional as it unjustifiably violated the rights to dignity, life and security of 
person.64  However, the court was of the opinion that to simply remove section 49(2) 
as shield against criminal prosecution would be against the principle of legality that 
does not only form part of our criminal law, but is also supported by section 35(3)(l) 
of the Constitution.65 
 
The great value of this case lies in the list of given factors to be considered by police 
officials when performing arrests:66 
 
a) The purpose of arrest is to bring before court for trial persons suspected of 
having committed offences; 
b) Arrest is not the only means of achieving this purpose, nor always the 
best; 
c) Arrest may never be used to punish a suspect; 
d) Where arrest is called for, force may be used only where it is necessary in 
order to carry out the arrest; 
e) Where force is necessary, only the least degree of force reasonably 
necessary to carry out the arrest may be used; 
f) In deciding what degree of force is both reasonable and necessary, all the 
circumstances must be taken into account, including the threat of violence 
the suspect poses to the arrestor or others, and the nature and 
circumstances of the offence the suspect is suspected of having 
committed, the force being proportional in all these circumstances; 
g) Shooting a suspect solely in order to carry out an arrest is permitted in 
very limited circumstances only; 
                                                          
63
     Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 207. 
64
     Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 202. 
65
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 616. 
66
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 616. Also see Du Toit et al. Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 5-28 – 5-30; 
Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 202-203. 
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h) Ordinarily, such shooting is not permitted unless the suspect poses a 
threat of violence to the arrestor or others or is suspected on reasonable 
grounds of having committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened 
infliction of serious bodily harm and there are no other reasonable means 
of carrying out the arrest, whether at that time or later; 
i) These limitations in no way detract the rights of an arrestor attempting to 
carry out an arrest to kill a suspect in self-defence or in defence of any 
other person.  
 
The final order given by the court in this matter was that the interpretation of section 
49(1)(b) in the Govender-decision67 was sound and that section 49(2) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was indeed inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid. 
The declaration of unconstitutionality of section 49(2) was prospective only.68 
 
3 The 2003 redefined section 49  
 
Following its constitutional considerations, section 49 was amended by section 7 of 
the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 122 of 1998. This Act was controversial 
as it had already been formulated in 1998 but, due to severe criticism by the then 
Minister of Safety and Security, was not yet implemented.69 It only came into force in 
2003, after a delay of five years.70 The 2003 redefined section 49  as amended by 
the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act,  reads as follows: 
 
 (1) For the purposes of this section- 
(a) “arrestor” means any person authorised under this Act to arrest 
or to assist in arresting a suspect; and 
(b) “suspect” means any person in respect of whom an arrestor has 
or had a reasonable suspicion that such person is committing or 
has committed an offence. 
 
(2) If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists 
the attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear 
                                                          
67
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 635. 
68
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 652-653. 
69
  Van der Walt 2007 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1):103-104. 
70
     Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure 201. Also see Le Roux-Kemp and Horne 2011 
SACJ 273; Van der Walt 2011 Potchefstroom Electronic Journal 139. 
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that an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the suspect 
cannot be arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in 
order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably 
necessary and proportional in the circumstances to overcome 
resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing: Provided that the 
arrestor is justified in terms of this section in using deadly force that 
is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a 
suspect, only if he or she believes on reasonable grounds- 
 
(a) that the force is immediately necessary for the purpose of 
protecting the arrestor, any person lawfully assisting the arrestor 
or any other person from imminent or future death or grievous 
bodily harm; 
(b) that there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause 
imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is 
delayed; or 
(c) that the offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and 
is of a forcible and serious nature and involves the use of life 
threatening violence or a strong likelihood that it will cause 
grievous bodily harm.71 
 
3.1  The effect and interpretation of the 2003 redefined section 49 
 
From the above it is clear that the 2003 redefined section 49(1) no longer provides 
the framework for the use of force, but only defines the terms ‘arrestor’ and ‘suspect’. 
Section 49(2) describes the circumstances in which force, as well as deadly force, 
may be employed. While the first part of section 49(2) addresses the use of force 
only, the concluding part sets the boundaries for the use of deadly force. 
 
What is also clear from the wording of the 2003 redefined section 49(2) is that the 
description of the circumstances in which the use of force would be allowed (what 
used to be section 49(1)), remained almost unchanged except for the inclusion of the 
‘proportional’ requirement.72 Force should no longer only be ‘reasonably necessary’, 
but also ‘proportional’. This test is now known as the proportionality test,73 and 
applies to both the use of force and the use of deadly force.74 
 
                                                          
71
  Snyman Criminal law 130. 
72
  Sibanda and Keebine-Sibanda 2003 Crime Research in South Africa s.p. 
73
     Le Roux-Kemp and Horne 2011 SACJ 277.  
74
     Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 203. 
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The requirement  that the use of force must be ‘reasonably necessary’, is generally 
interpreted as meaning that whatever force used must have been the only viable 
alternative to guarantee a successful arrest. If any other means of carrying out the 
arrest was available to the arrestor, those means should have been exhausted. In 
addition to this, the arrestor must, before discharging a firearm at a suspect, issue a 
verbal warning followed by the discharge of a warning shot. In the event that this 
does not have the desired effect, the arrestor should direct a shot at the lower 
extremities of the suspect, rather than the rest of his body.75 
 
With reference to the ‘proportionality’ requirement, it is clear from the  Matlou- and 
Govender-interpretations that the force should not only be proportional to the 
seriousness of the crime the suspect is thought to have committed, but also to the 
threat or danger the suspect poses to the arrestor, bystanders and society as a 
whole. This view was confirmed in the recent decision of April v Minister of Safety 
and Security.76 
 
On the other hand, the second part of the 2003 redefined section 49(2) replaces the 
entire previous section 49(2) that was declared unconstitutional in the Walters-case 
and proves to be even stricter than suggested by the court in the Walters-decision. It 
now allows the use of deadly violence in the following circumstances: 
 
Provided that the arrestor is justified in terms of this section in using 
deadly force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous 
bodily harm to a suspect, only if he or she believes on reasonable 
grounds- 
 
(a) that the force is immediately necessary for the purpose of 
protecting the arrestor, any person lawfully assisting the arrestor 
or any other person from imminent or death or grievous bodily 
harm; 
(b) that there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause 
imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is 
delayed; or 
(c) that the offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and 
is of a forcible and nature and involves the use of life threatening 
violence or a strong likelihood it will cause grievous bodily harm.77  
                                                          
75
  Snyman Criminal Law 131. 
76
  April v Minister of Safety and Security [2009] 2 SACR 1 (SE) 2, 8-9. 
77
  The 2003 redefined section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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Neethling and Potgieter78 summarise the second part of the 2003 redefined  section 
49 as containing the following requirements: 
(i) The arrestor must suspect on reasonable grounds; 
(ii) That deadly force is immediately necessary; 
(iii) To protect any person’s life or body; 
(iv) Against action that is immediately threatening or will happen in future. 
 
According to the previous section 49(2), the arrestor was entitled to kill or seriously 
injure the suspect in an attempt to prevent him from fleeing, where the suspect has 
committed a serious offence (Schedule 1 offence) like murder, even where the 
conduct of the suspect when apprehended by the arrestor was not immediately 
threatening to the arrestor, bystanders or society as a whole, and even if there was 
no danger that the suspect would kill or seriously injure someone in the future.79 
However, in terms of the 2003 redefined section 49(2), this is no longer possible.80 
Burchell81 applauds the removal of the reference to Schedule 1 listed offences and 
the emphasis that the 2003 redefined section 49 places on offences involving 
serious violence.  
 
Keebine-Sibanda and Sibanda82 note that, in addition to the ‘reasonably necessary’ 
and ‘proportionality’ requirements, the wording of the 2003 redefined section 49(2) 
also creates stricter conditions for the use of force by including phrases such as 
‘immediately necessary’, ‘substantial risk’, ‘forcible and serious nature’ and ‘strong 
likelihood’.  
 
Snyman,83 however, opines against the wording of the second part of the 2003 
redefined  section 49(2), in that it is at best, careless. He suggests that the content of 
section 49(2)(b) does not really differ in any way from what is already captured in 
section 49(2)(a).84 This view is supported by Burchell85 as well as Neethling and 
Potgieter.86 
                                                          
78
  Neethling and Potgieter 2004 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 605. 
79
  Snyman Criminal Law 134. 
80
     Le Roux-Kemp and Horne 2011 SACJ 278. 
81
     Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 207. 
82
  Keebine-Sibanda and Sibanda 2003 Crime Research in South Africa s.p. 
83
  Snyman Criminal Law 132. 
84
  Snyman Criminal Law 132-133.  
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The question also arose as to whether the 2003 redefined  section 49(2), as possible 
ground of justification, does not simply boil down to common law private defence? 
Burchell,87 as well as Snyman,88  propose that it does not. This opinion is supported, 
as the 2003 redefined section 49(2) refers to ‘future’ threats of death or bodily harm. 
One can only be successful with a private defence if the threat posed is imminent or 
immediate, while in the case of the 2003 redefined section 49(2), one can succeed 
where one protects oneself or another from imminent or future death or grievous 
bodily harm. 
 
Although this legislation provides for the protection of people against future harm, a 
great disadvantage to such a defence lies in the uncertainty as to what is meant by 
‘future danger’.89 Should a court interpret this concept narrowly, a section 49 defence 
would surely not succeed.  
 
Burchell90 raises concern about the introduction of the “future death” concept, 
arguing that to allow the use of deadly force where it is determined that a suspect 
might pose a threat in future, will only “serve to encourage a cycle of violence”. 
 
To shed some light on this ambiguity, the South African Police Service adopted a 
policy decision regarding the ‘future death’ concept.91 A threat of future death or 
grievous bodily harm would exist where a suspect was reasonably thought to be a 
serial murderer or rapist, although proof of past robberies would not qualify a suspect 
as being a serial robber and therefore would be excluded from posing a future threat. 
This, however, is unacceptable to the police and has been shown to lead to great 
confusion amongst police officers.92 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
85
     Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure  204. 
86
  Neethling and Potgieter 2004 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 605. 
87
     Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 205. 
88
  Snyman Criminal Law 134. 
89
  Bruce “Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by police” 8. 
90
     Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 205. 
91
  Geldenhuys “Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by police” 10. The wording, ‘future death’, was 
removed from the recently amended section 49, but it is submitted that the concept thereof is still 
implied with the removal of the word “immediate” before threat. See below. 
92
  Geldenhuys “Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by police” 10. 
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Neethling and Potgieter93 suggest that a future threat to death or serious harm exists 
where “the suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened 
infliction of serious bodily harm.” 
 
Snyman94 provides the following example: 
If, for example, the police have reliable information that Y has 
conspired with others to kill someone in three days’ time, or if they 
know that Y is a serial killer or rapist that will repeat her vile acts in 
future, they may kill or grievously harm Y during arrest, even though 
Y’s actions during the arrest do not constitute an immediate threat to 
anyone at the scene. 
 
Bruce95 proposes that, to ascertain legal certainty on the matter of ‘future’ threats, 
legislation must be properly worded to eliminate any vagueness. He suggests the 
following wording: 
 
Police officers may use deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect only if 
they have reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect (1) has 
committed an offence involving the actual or threatened infliction of 
serious physical injury or death, and (2) is likely to endanger human life 
or cause serious injury to another unless apprehended without delay.96 
 
In conclusion, despite the arguable careless wording at times, it is submitted that the 
legislature, in its drafting of the 2003 redefined section 49(2), succeeded in at least 
complying with the minimum requirements as laid down in the Govender- and 
Walters-decisions. The 2003 redefined section 49(2) is in fact even stricter than 
suggested by the court in the Walters-decision and at the same time, stretches 
beyond what is known as common law private defence. 
 
In the absence of clearly defined provisions or identifying criteria for what constitutes 
future threats,97 the policing community is expected to perform their arresting tasks 
                                                          
93
  Neethling and Potgieter 2004 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 605. 
94
  Snyman Criminal Law 134. 
95
  Bruce “Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by police” 9. 
96
  Bruce “Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by police” 9. 
97
  Also referred to as the “future danger” provision and comprehensively described in Van der Walt 
2011 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 141-143. 
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without clear guidance on how to evaluate and recognise such threats.98 Clarifying 
this concept is therefore vital to prevent misuse and to provide legal certainty.  
 
4 Recent amendments to section 49 
 
In an apparent effort to clarify the legal position on the use of force in arresting 
suspects, government formulated legislation to amend the 2003 redefined section 49 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Denying that its objective was to widen the 
circumstances under which police officers may use force to arrest suspects, 
government justified the formulation of amendment legislation by stating that the 
2003 redefined section 49 exhibits ambiguities that detrimentally affect the police’s 
ability to perform their tasks effectively,99 and that a need exists to align the 
provisions of section 49 with the  constitutional court judgment in the Walters-case. 
The proposed amendment of the 2003 redefined section 49 was drafted and is set 
out as follows in the Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill:100 
 
49. (1) For the purposes of this section— 
(a) ‘arrestor’ means any person authorised under this Act to 
arrest or to assist in arresting a suspect; [and] 
(b) ‘suspect’ means any person in respect of whom an arrestor 
has [or had] a reasonable suspicion that such person is 
committing or has committed an offence; and 
(c) ‘deadly force’ means force that is likely to cause serious 
bodily harm or death and includes, but is not limited to, 
shooting at a suspect with a firearm. 
 
(2) If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect 
resists the attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, 
when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him or her is being 
made, and the suspect cannot be arrested without the use of 
force, the arrestor may, in order to effect the arrest, use such 
force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the 
circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the 
suspect from fleeing:  
 but, in addition to the requirement that the force must be 
reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances, 
the arrestor may use deadly force only if -    
                                                          
98
  Van der Walt 2011 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 142. 
99
  Report on the OSF-SA roundtable discussion on the human rights and practical implications of 
the proposed amendment to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act: 2010:2. 
100
  GN 949 in GG 33619 of 7 October 2010. 
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(a) the suspect poses a threat of serious violence to the arrestor 
or any other person; or 
(b) the suspect is suspected on reasonable grounds of having 
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened 
infliction of serious bodily harm and there are no other 
reasonable means of effecting the arrest, whether at that 
time or later. 
 
The proposed Amendment Bill has been approved by the National Assembly and, at 
the time of publication of this article, has been submitted to the National Council of 
Provinces for concurrence.101 The revised version of the Bill introduces a clarifying 
provision, describing ‘deadly force’ in section 49(1)(c): 
 
(c) ‘deadly force’ means force that is likely to cause serious 
bodily harm or death and includes, but is not limited to, 
shooting at a suspect with a firearm. 
 
 
Once again the first part of the 2003 redefined section 49(2) (previous 49(1)) is left 
unchanged and the proposed amendments only focus on the second part of the 
2003 redefined section 49(2) – the use of deadly force. The key changes as 
proposed by the Bill, apart from the added definition of ‘deadly force’, includes the 
ejection of the requirement that deadly force can only be used when it is immediately 
necessary to protect the arrestor, and the allowance of deadly force to be used when 
the “suspect poses a threat of serious violence to the arrestor or any other person, or 
the suspect is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a crime 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm and there are no 
other reasonable means of effecting the arrest, whether at that time or later”.102 Le 
Roux-Kemp and Horne103 justly laments the replacement of the word “grievous” with 
“serious”, suggesting that if one follows the strict definitions of these words, “serious” 
denotes a less serious situation that “grievous”. This, of course, diminishes the strict 
criteria for use of deadly force to which the police must comply, while limiting the 
scope for acquiring liability.104 
                                                          
101
  SabinetLaw 2012 www.sabinetlaw.co.za/defence-and-security/articles/national-assembly-
passes-saps-bill. 
102
  Report on the OSF-SA roundtable discussion on the human rights and practical implications of 
the proposed amendment to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act: 2010:2. 
103
    Le Roux-Kemp and Horne 2011 SACJ 281. 
104
  Le Roux-Kemp and Horne 2011 SACJ 281. 
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In addition to the above-mentioned amendments, the “future death” predicament has 
also been deleted, but it is submitted that the concept thereof is still implied with the 
removal of the word “immediate” before threat. If there is no need for the existence of 
an immediate threat, it certainly allows the use of deadly force where the suspect 
poses a threat at any point in time, including future threats. Once again this will be 
left open for a wide array of different interpretations and this may lead to serious 
misuse of deadly force during arrests.  
 
In the preamble to the Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill of 2010, it is stated that 
the objective of the Bill is to substitute and align the provisions relating to the use of 
force in effecting arrests with a judgment of the Constitutional Court, namely the 
Walters-decision (in which the previous section 49(2) was declared unconstitutional). 
When the 2003 redefined section 49(2) was formulated, the legislature did not have 
the benefit of making use of the guidelines as set out in the Walters-decision (as 
discussed above). 
 
In drafting the proposed amendments to section 49, it seems that the legislature did 
little more than copy and paste from paragraph h)105 of the guidelines provided in the 
Walters-decision, without grasping the background, meaning and interpretation 
thereof. This unavoidably lead to justified criticism against the proposed 
amendments by Justice Kriegler (the author of the Walters-judgment and the 
guidelines used by the legislature), stating that the proposed amendment broadens 
the circumstances under which lethal force may be allowed and are, in fact, 
unconstitutional.106 
Although not specified as part of paragraph h) of the guidelines, it was first 
emphasised in the Govender-case that for the use of serious force to be justified, an 
immediate threat of serious bodily harm to the arrestor or the public had to exist. It 
was confirmed in the Walters-case “to be at the very least also the prerequisite in a 
                                                          
105
  “h) Ordinarily, such shooting is not permitted unless the suspect poses a threat of violence to the 
arrestor or others or is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a crime involving 
the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm and there are no other reasonable 
means of carrying out the arrest, whether at that time or later.” 
106
  Report on the OSF-SA roundtable discussion on the human rights and practical implications of 
the proposed amendment to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act: 2010:4 
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case where the suspect is killed by the arrestor.”107 The removal of the word 
‘immediate’ in describing the threat posed by the suspect, does therefore not align 
the recent, proposed section 49 with a thorough interpretation of the Walters-
judgment, as is the objective of the legislature. This criticism was echoed in 
submissions made to Parliament on the Bill by The Civil Society Prison Reform 
Initiative.108 
The recent section 49(2) further makes provision for the use of deadly force where 
someone is suspected on ‘reasonable grounds’ of having committed a crime 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm, without requiring 
that the suspect poses any threat at all. This would appear to be a movement back 
to the provisions of the old section 49(2), with the slight difference that it focuses on 
the commission of any offence involving serious violence, instead of any Schedule 1 
listed offence. According to De Vos,109 this  amendment is unconstitutional and in 
violation with the right to dignity, life and bodily integrity.  
 
It is submitted that the amendments to section 49(2) is a definite step backwards 
from the objectives of legislation on the use of force in effecting arrests. This opinion 
enjoys widespread support. During the public hearings on the Criminal Procedure 
Amendment Bill, held on 23 August 2011, it was affirmed that passing of the 
Amendment Bill in its current form would aggravate the problem of the existing high 
levels of force employed by the police.110 
 
5 COMPARATIVE STUDY  
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
As is the case in South Africa, many foreign police jurisdictions occasionally struggle 
with the reconciliation of various demands, such as the maintenance of public order 
                                                          
107
  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security ad Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] 4 SA 
613 (CC) 616. 
108
  PMG 2011 www.pmg.org.za/print/28019. 
109
  Report on the OSF-SA roundtable discussion on the human rights and practical implications of 
the proposed amendment to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act: 2010:3-4. 
110
  PMG 2011 www.pmg.org.za/print/28019. 
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and basic law enforcement.111 The use of force as medium for efficacious law 
enforcement remains a contentious issue in most countries, but Stone112 proposes 
that there is an international movement towards greater accountability by police 
officers for the force they employ against civilians. 
 
For the purposes of this article, the guidelines pertaining to the use of deadly force 
by police officers in the United States of America and the United Kingdom are 
assessed and compared to those of South Africa. 
 
5.2  United States of America 
 
Employment of force, especially deadly force, by members of law enforcement 
communities is a contentious issue in the United States of America.113 
 
Police in America are permitted the legal right to use force114 but excessive force115 
may cause offenders to be subject to criminal prosecution, civil liability, etcetera.116    
Governing the determination of what constitutes excessive use of force by any police 
officer in the United States, is the “objective reasonableness” test under the Fourth 
Amendment117 of the Constitution of the United States of America, outlined in 
Graham v Conner.118 The United States Supreme Court held in Graham v Conner 
that the “objective reasonableness” test is to be applied to all allegations of police 
use of force, whether during an arrest, an investigation, or other seizures of free 
citizens, and whether such use of force was deadly or not.119  
 
                                                          
111
  Rappert 2002 British Journal of Criminology (42):689.  
112
  Stone 2007 Theoretical Criminology 245. 
113
  Lee and Vaughn 2010 Journal of Criminal Justice 193. 
114
  The English common law permitting forceful arrests are still applied in the United States of 
America and also form the basis of the South African section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act – 
Du Toit et al. Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 5-31. 
115
  Excessive force can be defined as force that is “unreasonable or unnecessary to accomplish a 
legal objective” – Lee and Vaughn 2010 Journal of Criminal Justice 193. 
116
  Lee and Vaughn 2010 Journal of Criminal Justice 193. 
117
  Constitution of the Unites States of America – The Fourth Amendment dictates the right of 
people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizure, to be protected 
against violation, and that warrants for arrests may only be issues upon probable cause to do so. 
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  490 U.S. 386, 104 L.Ed.2d 443, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989). 
119
  Graham v Connor 490 U.S. 386, 104 L.Ed.2d 443, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989). 
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The decision to use deadly force by police officials is guided by the administrative 
policies and regulations of each police department, or departments in a particular 
state.120 In drafting these policies and regulations, authors must have due regard to 
the different use-of-deadly-force standards established by case law, legislation, as 
well as departmental, municipal and public policy.121 Drafting authors must also 
determine whether the use of force, specifically deadly force, will be subject to 
disciplinary review whenever a firearm is merely discharged, or whether, as in the 
case of South Africa, review will only take place once the use of force resulted in 
serious injury or death.122 
 
The least restrictive of all the standards on the use of deadly force was delineated in 
the Supreme Court case Tennessee v Garner.123 This case provides for the use of 
deadly force against fleeing suspects, a provision that is expectedly subject to strict 
criteria.124 A police officer may, under this case law, only employ deadly force 
against a fleeing suspect if: a) the deadly force is necessary to prevent escape, b) 
the suspect threatened the officer with a weapon or the officer has probable cause to 
believe the suspect inflicted grievous bodily harm, and c) the officer has warned the 
suspect of imminent use of deadly force.125 This standard is also subject to the 
reasonableness requirement under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.126 Prior to the decision in the Garner case, the United States applied 
old English common law rules allowing officers to use any means necessary, 
including deadly force, to arrest felony suspects or prevent them from fleeing.127  
 
In support of the Garner case, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 2007 in Scott v 
Harris128 that deadly force may be used during a high-speed vehicle pursuit since the 
                                                          
120
  Brave and Peters 1992 www.laaw.com/uodfs; Lee and Vaughn 2010 Journal of Criminal Justice 
193; Thompson 2011 Report on the workshop: Developing a use-of-force policy for the South 
African Police Service 7. 
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  Tennessee v Garner 471 U.S. 1, 85 L.Ed.2d 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (1985). 
127
  Tennenbaum 1994 The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 242. 
128
  550 U.S. 372,S.Ct. 1769 (2007). 
 R BOTHA AND J VISSER                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)2 
368 / 569 
 
escaping, speeding vehicle was in fact an instrument of deadly force, endangering 
innocent lives. 
Despite the allowance in Tennessee v Garner, police officers will be held individually 
accountable where they deviate, even in the slightest, from the set criteria, or recent 
institutional or legal developments. For example, members of the police force will be 
held liable where they kill or injure unarmed persons they believed at the time to be 
armed.129 
 
Justification for the employment of deadly force during the execution of an arrest is 
provided for by section 11.05 of the Model Penal Code. The Code allows for deadly 
force to be used by police officers during an arrest, only when the following 
requirements are met: 1) the arrest is for a felony,130 2) when the arresting officer 
believes that force is immediately necessary to execute the arrest or prevent the 
suspect from fleeing, 3) the intent of the arresting officer has been made clear to the 
suspect, 4) the officer believes that no substantial risk of harm exists for bystanders, 
5) the officer believes that the crime committed by the suspect includes the use or 
threat of deadly force, and 6) that the arresting officer is of the opinion that there is 
substantial risk that the suspect will kill or seriously injure someone if arrest is 
delayed.131 
 
The Commission of Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies in the United States 
crafted the so-called “defence of life standard” that dictates that law enforcement 
officers may employ deadly force only upon the reasonable belief that such action is 
in defence of life, whether his own or that of another.132 
 
A much more restrictive version of the “defence of life standard” employed by some 
states, including the Dallas Police Department, is the “preservation of life 
                                                          
129
  Lee and Vaughn 2010 Journal of Criminal Justice 195. 
130
  A felony is defined as a crime sufficiently serious to be punishable by death or a term in state or 
federal prison, as distinguished from a misdemeanour which is only punishable by confinement 
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131  LEXISNEXIS Use of force for law enforcement purposes 
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standard”.133 This standard dictates stricter criteria for the use of deadly force and 
provides that officers may only use such force when all other alternatives have been 
exhausted or failed, when there is no risk of harm to bystanders and when, as last 
resort, serious threat to life exists.134 
 
In their research on the topic of standards adopted by police departments, Brave and 
Peters135 state that where police departments adopt certain standards, these 
standards cannot be less restrictive than posed by the stated case law. Therefore, all 
criteria expressed in the Garner case must at least be complied with. Police officers 
must then be trained relentlessly in accordance with the principles and criteria of the 
chosen standards. Failure to properly train police in the use-of-force policies, 
especially since governments arm police with firearms and expect them to manage 
dangerous situations, amounts to an intentional indifference to the rights of those the 
police interact with.136  
 
5.3  The United Kingdom 
 
As previously stated, English common law authorised law enforcement officers to 
employ any means necessary to arrest suspects and to prevent them from 
escaping.137 This rule therefore sanctioned the use of deadly force in circumstances 
where the suspect posed no risk of harm to the officers or bystanders.  
 
The rules of English common law pertaining to the use of force were repealed by 
section 3 of the Criminal Law Act of 1967.138 This section holds that a person 
carrying out an arrest may employ such force as is reasonable in the circumstances 
in the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders 
or suspected offenders.139  
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In response to the question as to what constitutes “reasonable” force, section 76 of 
the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act of 2008 was promulgated. Section 76(3) 
dictates that a subjective test for evaluation of the reasonableness of the officer’s 
conduct must be used. This section further reads: 
 
Section 76 
“(3)The question whether the degree of force used by D was reasonable 
in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the 
circumstances as D believed them to be, and subsections (4) to (8) 
also apply in connection with deciding that question.” 
 
The Act further holds that in the determination of whether a police officer indeed held 
a certain belief, due regard must be given to the reasonableness of such belief. If it is 
determined that he indeed did subjectively embrace such belief, later proof that such 
belief was mistaken would be irrelevant, unless the mistake was attributable to 
voluntary intoxication.140 
 
Mimicking the proportionality provision in section 49 of the South African Criminal 
Procedure Act, as well as the recent amendments, section 76(6) of the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act of 2008  stipulates that the degree of force employed by 
a police officer would not be deemed reasonable in the circumstances the officer 
believed them to be if the degree of force is disproportionate to the circumstances. 
 
After the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001, 
London’s Metropolitan Police Service adopted a set of policies pertaining to the use 
of deadly force, or so-called “shoot-to-kill” tactics, in dealing with suspected 
terrorists. These policies were referred to as Operation Kratos.141 
 
When Jean Charles de Menezes was erroneously shot and killed in London in 2005, 
a public outcry sounded throughout the United Kingdom as to the freedoms 
conferred upon police officers by Operation Kratos.142 Soon after this incident, 
Scotland Yard indicated that they altered the rules of this anti-terrorist tactics (though 
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the changes were not publicised) and reiterated its use in intelligence led anti-
terrorism only.143 
 
5.4  Conclusion 
 
Policing the use of force in effecting arrests in the United States of America differs 
greatly from that in South Africa and the United Kingdom. Regulation and reviews of 
instances where violence were used by arresting police officers in America are 
conducted on state or local level, whereas in South Africa and the United Kingdom, it 
is performed on national level by way of enacted legislation.144 
 
While the proportionality requirement features prominently in the legislative 
provisions of both South African and the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America seem to rather place emphasis on reasonability. ‘Reasonableness’, 
however, is the feature requisite in all the jurisdictions under discussion. In America, 
the test for reasonableness is an objective one, contrasted with the subjective test 
employed in the United Kingdom. The courts in America, for instance, will judge 
police officers’ conduct in light of what the actual circumstances were, as opposed to 
what the relevant officers believed them to be. South African courts follow the latter 
approach.  
 
Although the standards for use of force in the United States of America vary between 
strict and highly restrictive, it remains that American provisions regulating use of 
force in effecting arrests are more restrictive in nature than that of the United 
Kingdom. The legislative amendments to section 49 of the South African Criminal 
Procedure Act causes the regulatory framework of forceful arrests to lean more 
toward that of lenient United Kingdom, giving arresting officers a greater playing field 
to use force when arresting suspects. 
 
The reliance on the ‘reasonableness’ requirement in the United States and United 
Kingdom causes an immense need for proper and thorough training of the police 
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144
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officers required to interpret the regulatory provisions within a very brief decision-
making window. It is therefore incumbent upon the governments and police 
authorities to provide training to those expected to enforce the law in sometimes 
volatile situations.  
 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is an unobjectionable fact that the use of force, even deadly force, in effecting 
arrests is unavoidable in certain situations. The circumstances and degree to which 
it may be employed has, however, been under debate for centuries. South Africa is 
again on the verge of legislative changes with regards to the powers conferred to 
police in using force in carrying out arrests. 
 
The acceptance and institution of changes as proposed by the Criminal Law 
Amendment Bill of 2010, represents a definitive widening of police powers to use 
force. This is great cause for concern. Relaxed criteria for the use of force, including 
deadly force, could potentially lead to police officers using violence unnecessarily 
and freely in carrying out arrests. 
 
Although clumsily worded, the 2003 redefined section 49(2) is aligned with the 
provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa to a much greater 
extent than the recent amendments, and it extends the powers of arrestors beyond 
mere common law private defence. 
 
Of course, there is scope for improvement on the 2003 redefined section 49. Its 
vague formulation can be cured by including definitions for ‘deadly force’, as can be 
found in the amendments approved by the National Assembly, as well as for the 
term ‘substantial risk of future death’.   
 
Ideally, the concept of use of violence in arresting youth offenders should also be 
addressed in legislation,145 as well as the safety and security of bystanders where 
force is used in effecting arrests, as is the case in the United States of America with, 
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  Report on the OSF-SA roundtable discussion on the human rights and practical implications of 
the proposed amendment to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act: 2010:5. 
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for example, the Model Penal Code provisions and the ‘preservation of life’ 
standard.146 
 
One should also not lose sight of the fact that, regardless of provisions of the 2003 
redefined section 49, the number of killings by police officers has increased 
tremendously over the last few years, highlighting the disability of legislation alone to 
control use of force by police.147 Mistry et al.148 reminds us that legislative alterations 
impact the number of suspects injured or killed by police officers on the short term 
only, and that meticulously designed strategies must be developed to supplement 
legislative provisions regulating use of force in effecting arrests. It is therefore 
submitted that in addition to the legislative rules, the South African Police Service 
formulate policies to further delineate and clarify appropriate conduct in situations 
traditionally requiring the employment of violence in arresting suspects. 
  
The importance of training along with the development and adoption of internal 
policies cannot be overstated.149 This will have the effect of increasing the standards 
of objective belief, which, in turn, will lead to certainty amongst police officials in 
when and how to use force effectively and justifiably. The many challenges faced by 
arresting officers everyday can only be overcome through proper training.150 
 
Burger151 supports the need for training and suggests the following to minimise 
unreasonable application of force in effecting arrests: 
 
i)    Capacitating the SAPS Training Division to enable adequate training 
ii)  Ensuring that proper command and control systems are in place at 
police stations 
iii) Strengthening the police’s internal inspectorate to conduct regular 
inspections 
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  American Penal Code: S 11.05(4). See also Bruce “Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by 
police” 9. 
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  Mistry et al. 2001 Research report: The use of force by members of the South African Police 
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iv)  Enabling the ICD to effectively perform its oversight functions to 
ensure that    every incident of the use of deadly force and all forms 
of serious misconduct are investigated and where appropriate, 
criminally prosecuted. 
 
It will also be of great benefit to adopt ‘standards of use of force’ or internal police 
policies, as is the practice in the United States of America, whether nationally or 
provincially, in terms of which police officers must be trained and continuously 
informed and assisted regarding the decisions involved in the use of force while 
carrying out their duties. Until such pragmatic options are adopted and implemented 
with the full dedication and focus of police management, legislation in all forms and 
variations is likely to have little success. 
 
Finally, on the issue of police safety, it has been submitted152 that widened powers to 
use force during arrests will not serve to increase the safety of police officers in the 
line of duty.153 
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